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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2012-15
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefitting from a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self-evaluations even if agents' payoffs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their payoffs.
Schlagwörter: 
Contracts
Subjective Performance Evaluations
Reciprocity
JEL: 
D01
D02
D82
D86
J41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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