Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73874
Authors: 
Sebald, Alexander
Walzl, Markus
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2012-15
Abstract: 
We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefitting from a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self-evaluations even if agents' payoffs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their payoffs.
Subjects: 
Contracts
Subjective Performance Evaluations
Reciprocity
JEL: 
D01
D02
D82
D86
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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