Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73808
Authors: 
Hainz, Christa
Wiegand, Manuel
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Ifo Working Paper 157
Abstract: 
During the financial crisis asymmetric information in credit markets became moresevere. Did relationship banking help firms to avoid impaired credit financing andwhich credit financing problems did relationship banking help to circumvent? We usesurvey data for 1,139 German firms to analyze how relationship banking works. Wefind that it lowers the probability of higher information requirements from banks. Itdoes not, however, help to avoid constrained availability of bank credit. If credit isgranted, relationship banking makes deteriorated non-price contract terms (i.e. collateraland maturity) less likely. Its impact on interest rates is ambiguous.
Subjects: 
Credit financing
relationship banking
financial crisis
access to credit
JEL: 
G21
G01
G28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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