Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73753
Authors: 
Holzner, Christian
Meier, Volker
Werding, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Ifo Working Paper 29
Abstract: 
The consequences of introducing or tightening time limits on receiving high unemploymentbenefits are studied in a shirking model. Stricter time limits have an ambiguousimpact on the net wage, and changes of utility levels of employed workers and recipientsof high unemployment benefits have the same sign as the variation in the netwage. The utility differential between the two groups of unemployed shrinks. The relativeincome position of skilled workers moves in the same direction as the net wage ofunskilled workers. When access to high benefits is denied for caught shirkers, strictertime limits may decrease employment.
Subjects: 
Unemployment benefits
welfare benefits
time limits
efficiency wages
JEL: 
H53
J41
J60
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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