Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73680 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Ruhr Economic Papers No. 412
Verlag: 
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
In recent health care reforms, several countries have replaced pure payment schemes for physicians (fee-for-service, capitation) by so-called mixed payment schemes. Until now it is still an unresolved issue whether patients are really better off after these reforms. In this study we compare the effects resulting from pure and mixed incentives for physicians under controlled laboratory conditions. Subjects in the role of physicians choose the quantity of medical services for different patient types. Real patients gain a monetary benefit from subjects' decisions. Our results reveal that overprovision observed in fee-for-service schemes and underprovision observed in capitation schemes can, in fact, be reduced by mixed incentives. Interestingly, even the presentation of pure incentives as mixed incentives already significantly affects physicians' behavior. Moreover, the mixed payment schemes generally provide a higher benefit-remuneration ratio than the respective pure payment schemes. Our findings provide some valuable insights for designing health care reforms.
Schlagwörter: 
physician incentive schemes
fee-for-service
capitation
mixed payment
laboratory experiment
presentation effect
benefit-remuneration analysis
JEL: 
C91
I11
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-467-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
411.73 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.