Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73525
Authors: 
Czermak, Simon
Feri, Francesco
Rützler, Daniela
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2010-15
Abstract: 
We examine the strategic sophistication of adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy and equilibrium payoffs are not too unequal. Using a mixture model we can estimate for each subject the probability to be any of eight different strategic and non-strategic types. The econometric estimation reveals that older subjects are more likely to eliminate dominated strategies, and that subjects with good math grades are more strategic.
Subjects: 
Strategic thinking
beliefs
experiment
age
adolescents
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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