Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73383
Authors: 
Mittermaier, Ferdinand
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper 32
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the role that foreign vs. domestic ownership of companies plays for governments in asymmetric countries’ competition for a multinational’s subsidiary. I argue that equilibrium subsidies as well as a foreign investor’s location decision in policy competition between these countries critically depend on the ownership structure of incumbent firms. This shows that small countries with few national incumbents in an industry may be successful in attracting multinationals.
Subjects: 
Subsidy competition
foreign direct investment
regional location
JEL: 
F12
F23
H25
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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