Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73339 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 28
Publisher: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), Nürnberg
Abstract: 
In this paper we show that the equilibrium in the Stiglitz-Weiss model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) is a two-interest rate equilibrium. For this we use the true return-function for banks shown by Arnold (2005), the assumption of Bertrand competition and make a consideration for a discrete number of borrowers. Rationing only affects one group of the borrowers, i.e. the borrowers with a safe project. The risky group always receives the funds it demands.
Subjects: 
credit rationing
asymmetric information
adverse selection
JEL: 
D82
E51
G21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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