Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73301
Authors: 
Mayr, Karin
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz 0308
Abstract: 
This paper examines the effect of immigration on the level of income redistribution via majority voting on the income tax. As a main result, we derive multiple tax equilibria if immigrants are allowed to vote and the skill composition of natives is not too homogeneous. In this case, the outcome of a native referendum on giving immigrants the right to vote would be negative, since immigrants could overthrow the native majority and change the tax rate that is utility-maximising for natives. It is found that at best, natives are indifferent towards immigrant voting, and the outcome of a corresponding referendum would be indeterminate.
Subjects: 
Political Economy
Immigration
Income Redistribution
JEL: 
F22
H73
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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