Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73288
Authors: 
Atteneder, Christine
Halla, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz 0618
Abstract: 
We model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time of divorce. First we assume an institutional setting where only sole custody is available. In a second step we reform this institutional setting and introduce the possibility of joint custody. We show that some parents, who would not be able to find an agreement in a sole custody regime, can find an agreement after the joint custody reform. Accordingly, our empirical analysis shows that the introduction of joint custody enables more parents to divorce by mutual consent.
Subjects: 
(joint) custody
divorce
family law
bargaining
JEL: 
J12
J13
K36
D1
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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