Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73183 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics No. 259
Verlag: 
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lüneburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.
Schlagwörter: 
absenteeism
bonus
effort
incentives
insider econometrics
wages
JEL: 
J22
J24
J31
J33
M12
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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