Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73179 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics No. 275
Verlag: 
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lüneburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Through disaggregating public expenditures by economic functions this paper offers a new perspective on the existence and effectiveness of electorally motivated expenditure policy. The aim of the paper is to provide more detailed information on the specific expenditure categories by which politicians try to affect election results. Based on COFOG data for 32 OECD and Eastern European countries over the years 1990-2010, it is shown that political expenditure cycles in total expenditures as well as in specific expenditure categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, the paper also provides evidence that these electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the reelection probability.
Schlagwörter: 
political expenditure cycle
political economy
re-election probability
COFOG
JEL: 
H11
H30
H50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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