Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73092
Authors: 
Greiff, Matthias
Paetzel, Fabian
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 36-2012
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of the next period, participants are re-matched and, except for the two control treatments, receive information resulting from the previous period's evaluations. There are three information treatments: Participants receive information either about their own evaluation or about their partner's evaluation or both. Although participants condition their contributions on their partners' evaluations, this information alone is insufficient to raise contributions. Only if participants also know their own evaluation, we do find a significant increase in contributions relative to the control treatments.
Subjects: 
Conditional Cooperation
Evaluation
Public Good Games
Prisoner's Dilemma
Repeated games with varying partners
Reputation
Second-order beliefs
JEL: 
C72
C91
D03
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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