Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73059
Authors: 
Hefeker, Carsten
Neugart, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 09-2013
Abstract: 
The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are interdependent, the incidence of field cases decreases while for those policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.
Subjects: 
European Union law
directives
compliance
European Court of Justice
court behavior
uncertainty
legal process
European Commission
JEL: 
D72
D78
K41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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