Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73032
Authors: 
Dietz, Simon
Marchiori, Carmen
Tavoni, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 76.2012
Abstract: 
The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a strong analogy with the behaviour of an individual or firm in other strategic contexts. In reality, however, various domestic special interests shape environmental policy, including how national governments cooperate on cross-border issues. Therefore in this paper we introduce to a classic model of international environmental cooperation the phenomenon of domestic political competition, whereby lobby groups seek to influence policy by offering to fund political campaigning. We use the model to establish some general conditions for the effects of lobbying on the stringency of policy and the size of coalitions cooperating to provide an environmental good. Using specific functional forms, we obtain a range of further results, including circumstances in which the omission of lobbying results in environmental protection being underestimated.
Subjects: 
Game Theory
International Environmental Agreements
Lobbying
Special-Interest Groups
Strategic Cooperation
JEL: 
C7
H41
K33
Q2
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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