Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/72969 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 02.2013
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the name but not the type of the other players. Learning occurs via matching and using Bayes' rule. We introduce the notion of a stable and consistent outcome, and show how the interaction between blocking and learning behavior shapes the existence of paths to stability in each of the uncertainty environments. Existence of stable and consistent outcomes then follows as a side result.
Schlagwörter: 
Consistent Outcomes
One-to-One Uncertainty
Many-to-One Uncertainty
Paths to Stability
Two-Sided Matching
JEL: 
C62
C78
D71
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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