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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series No. 208
Verlag: 
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go pension system with a tax benefit link affects retirement incentives and work incentives of prime-age workers. We find that postponed retirement tends to harm incentives of prime-age workers in the presence of a tax benefit link, thereby creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor supply. We show how several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old workers, or, indeed, both groups under appropriate conditions. We also provide a sharp characterization of the excess burden of pension insurance and show how it depends on the behavioral supply elasticities on the extensive and intensive margins and the effective tax rates implicit in contribution rates.
Schlagwörter: 
pension reform
retirement
hours worked
tax benefit link
actuarial adjustment
excess burden
JEL: 
H55
J26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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