Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72715
Authors: 
Koziashvili, Arkadi
Nitzan, Shmuel
Tobol, Yossef
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 259
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a new model of market structure determination. It demonstrates that market structure need not be the result of ideology, political power, collusion among producers or the nature of the technology. In our setting, it is determined by bureaucrats who maximize their share of the industry profits. The approach is illustrated by studying the relationship between industry size and the existing institutional norm and by identifying the bureaucrats' most preferred norm. In the latter context, we establish the fundamental inverse relationship between the costs of interaction with government officials and industry size.
Subjects: 
institutional norms
bureaucracy costs
norm viability
industry size
JEL: 
D72
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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