Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72564
Authors: 
Hansen, Stephen
McMahon, Michael
Rivera, Carlos Velasco
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4201
Abstract: 
Using voting data from the Bank of England, we show that different individual assessments of the economy strongly influence votes after controlling for individual policy preferences. We estimate that internal members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish, though preference differences are very small if members vote strategically. Counterfactual analysis shows that committees add value through aggregating private assessments, but that gains to larger committees taper off quickly beyond five members. There is no evidence that externals add value through preference moderation. Since their assessments also have lower precision, mixed committees may not be optimal.
Subjects: 
committees
monetary policy
JEL: 
E52
E58
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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