Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/72418 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series No. WP05/01
Publisher: 
University College Dublin, Department of Economics, Dublin
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the puzzle that public services in some developing countries, especially in Africa, are poor despite large public expenditure. The intertemporal model here studies a government’s optimal choice between redistribution and public investment. Ethnic diversity and political uncertainty reinforce one another in producing myopic government behaviour which results in underinvestment. Above some critical value of political instability, it is optimal for the government not to invest at all.
Subjects: 
political instability
myopic behaviour
public finance
corruption
political economy
developing countries
JEL: 
E62
O23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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