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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series No. WP06/05
Verlag: 
University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics, Dublin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper offers a theoretical explanation for the determination of exchange rates under specific conditions which can/could be found in some OECD and newly industrialised countries. In an Obstfeld (1994) framework extended to incorporate government expropriation reneging on a fixed exchange rate promise unambiguously produces short term benefits, but long term losses. The choice of exchange rate regime depends on the combined effect of greediness (expropriation) and impatience (political instability), though not straightforwardly. In particular, similarly stable countries may choose different exchange rate regimes due to different levels of rent-seeking, for instance Mexico and Chile in the 1980s.
Schlagwörter: 
exchange rate regime
monetary policy
fiscal policy
expropriation
political instability
political economy
JEL: 
E42
F41
H29
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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