Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72410
Authors: 
Parlane, Sarah
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, UCD Centre for Economic Research 05/25
Abstract: 
This paper analyses strategic market allocation by two auctioneers holding substitutes. It characterizes both the cooperative and competitive outcomes. Under cooperation or competition with close substitutes, bidders are allocated according to the expected total surplus each generates. This market division is efficient if and only if the distribution of bidders´ tastes is not skewed. If skewed, reserve prices distort participation towards the least preferred item. For greater degrees of product di¤erentiation competition leads to multiple equilibria. Finally, competition with close substitutes sellers leave participation rents to their weakest bidder. They do not in other cases, whether they compete or cooperate.
Subjects: 
Competition
Auctions
Reserve prices
Efficiency
JEL: 
D43
D44
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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