Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72390
Authors: 
Bohn, Frank
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, UCD Centre for Economic Research 04/13
Abstract: 
This paper studies a policymaker’s optimal choice between redistribution and efficient public investment. Under political instability, there is myopic government behavior which results in underinvestment. Above some critical value of political instability, it is optimal not to invest at all. This finding also suggests that it may be rational for governments to refrain from anti-corruption investment, even if they are not rent-seeking themselves.
Subjects: 
political instability
myopic behavior
public investment
corruption
political economy
transition and developing countries
JEL: 
E62
O23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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