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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series No. WP02/07
Verlag: 
University College Dublin, Department of Economics, Dublin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines how time to build alters strategic investment behaviour under oligopoly. Facing demand uncertainty, firms decide whether to invest early or wait until uncertainty has been resolved. A game that captures time-to-build investment is contrasted with another one in which investment is quick in place. We show that a time lag between when and how much to invest reduces the incentive to delay. When investment requires time to complete, early investment occurs more to avoid becoming a follower than to become a strategic investment leader. The opposite is true with quick-in-place investment. A brief welfare analysis is provided.
Schlagwörter: 
Time-to-build Investment
Uncertainty
Strategic Commitment
Flexibility
Oligopoly
JEL: 
D80
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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