Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72292
Authors: 
Coricelli, Giorgio
Fehr, Dietmar
Fellner, Gerlinde
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 151
Abstract: 
This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a twoperson public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.
Subjects: 
public goods
partner selection
experimental economics
JEL: 
C91
D62
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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