Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72266
Authors: 
Paterson, Iain
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 187
Abstract: 
Analysis of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union shows that there is a serious discrepancy between the voting power gradient of Member States computed by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Given the lack of compelling arguments to choose between these indices on purely axiomatic grounds, we turn to a probabilistic approach as pioneered by Straffin (1977) focusing on the probability distribution of voting poll outcomes. We present a unifying model of power indices as expected decisiveness, which shows that the defining feature of each approach is a particular distribution of the voting poll. Empirical evidence drawn from voting situations, in addition to a consideration of first principles, leads us to reject one of these approaches. The unified formulation allows us to develop useful related concepts of efficiency and blocking leverage, previously used solely by a 'Banzhaf' approach, for the case of Shapley-Shubik, and a comparison of results is shown.
Subjects: 
voting power indices
power gradient
coefficient of representation
expected decisiveness
efficiency
blocking leverage
Constitution of the European Union
JEL: 
C43
C71
D02
D71
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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