Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72017
Authors: 
Harrington, Joseph E.
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 460
Abstract: 
Price dynamics are characterized when a price-fixing cartel is concerned about creating suspicions of the presence of a cartel A dynamical extension of static models yields the counterfactual prediction that the cartel initially raises price and then gradually lowers it An alternative specification generates a more plausible result that the cartel gradually raises price For that specification the long-run cartel price is found to be decreasing in the damage multiple but is independent of the level of fixed fines A more stringent standard for calculating damages is shown to induce the cartel to price higher
Subjects: 
Collusion
Cartel Detection
Antitrust
JEL: 
L1
L4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
397.47 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.