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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 437
Verlag: 
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics, Baltimore, MD
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider processes in which new technologies and forms of behavior are transmitted through social and geographic networks Agents adopt behaviors based on a combination of their inherent payoff and their local popularity (the number of neighbors who have adopted them) subject to some random error We characterize the long-run dynamics of such processes in terms of the geometry of the network but without placing a priori restrictions on the network structure When agents interact in sufficiently small close-knit groups the expected waiting time until almost everyone is playing the stochastically stable equilibrium is bounded above independently of the number of agents and independently of the initial state.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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