Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72010
Authors: 
Chen, Joe
Harrington, Joseph E.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 528
Abstract: 
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners?Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms?prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that partial leniency programs - such as in the U.S. - can make collusion easier compared to offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
309.16 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.