Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71967 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2007-12
Publisher: 
University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance, Innsbruck
Abstract: 
While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.
Subjects: 
experiment
dictator game
team behavior
social preferences
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
199.16 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.