Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71957
Authors: 
Currarini, Sergio
Feri, Francesco
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2007-15
Abstract: 
We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of private signals. Using the general model developed by Raith (1996), we show that if firms are allowed to make bilateral exclusive sharing agreements, then some degree of information sharing is consistent with equilibrium, and is a constant feature of equilibrium when the number of firms is not too small. Our result is to be contrasted with the traditional conclusion that no information is shared in common values situations with strategic substitutes - such as Cournot competition with demand shocks - when firms can only make industry-wide sharing contracts (e.g., a trade association).
Subjects: 
information sharing
oligopoly
networks
Bayesian equilibrium
JEL: 
D43
D82
D85
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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