Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71935
Authors: 
Rivas, Maria Fernanda
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2008-25
Abstract: 
We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last, instead of first, also increase contributions. The experimental results are: (i) Reward options yield lower contributions than punishment through exclusion. (ii) Endogenous leadership is much more efficient than exogenously imposed leadership. (iii) Sequentiality itself is not beneficial for contributions since groups where the leader contributes as the last member do not contribute more than groups without a leader.
Subjects: 
public goods experiment
leadership
exclusion power
reward
endogeneity
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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