Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71931 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2008-20
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance, Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. Using the seminal design of Smith et al. (1988) we find that markets where traders are asymmetrically informed about future dividends have smaller, and shorter, bubbles than markets with symmetrically informed or uninformed traders. Hence, fundamental values are better reflected in market prices - implying higher market efficiency - when some traders know more than others about the future prospects of an asset. We also find that asymmetric information has a similar abating impact on bubbles as when uninformed traders accumulate experience, though for different reasons.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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