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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2007-23
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance, Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even though in reality teams were largely involved in those auctions, experimental studies on bidding in auctions have so far relied on individual bidders. Our results show that teams stay on average longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction and pay significantly higher prices than individuals. Consequently, teams make smaller profits and suffer more often the winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since the bidders with the highest valuation are more likely to win the auction when teams bid.
Schlagwörter: 
UMTS auction
team decision-making
experiment
winner's curse
JEL: 
C91
C92
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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