Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71890
Authors: 
Rieck, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 16/2010
Abstract: 
In innovation contests, the progress of the competing firms in the innovation process is usually their private information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a fixed cost, but their progress is publicly announced. We make a comparison with the case of no information revelation: if the progress is disclosed, the expected profit of the firms is higher, but the expected profit of the sponsor is lower. Additionally, we show that firms may voluntarily reveal their information.
Subjects: 
Contest
innovation
information revelation
JEL: 
O32
D82
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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