Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71611 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7307
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We conduct a contribution game for a real public good and show that when the contributors value the real public good highly, they increase their contributions in each round. Thus, contrary to previous literature, free riding decreases over rounds and the end-game effect is reversed.
Subjects: 
public goods experiment
end-game effect
free-riding
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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