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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFS Working Papers No. 07/01
Verlag: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Zusammenfassung: 
We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives.
Schlagwörter: 
Nash equilibrium
Intra-household allocation
Slutsky symmetry
JEL: 
D11
C72
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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