Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71604
Authors: 
Lechene, Valérie
Preston, Ian
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 07/01
Abstract: 
We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives.
Subjects: 
Nash equilibrium
Intra-household allocation
Slutsky symmetry
JEL: 
D11
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
618.02 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.