Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71511 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFS Working Papers No. 01/19
Verlag: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Zusammenfassung: 
We present identification and estimation results for the “collective” model of labour supply in which there are discrete choices, censoring of hours and nonparticipation in employment. We derive the collective restrictions on labour supply functions and contrast them with restrictions implied by the usual “unitary” framework. Using the large changes in the wage structure between men and women in the UK over the last two decades we estimate a collective labor supply model for married couples without children. The implications of the unitary framework are rejected while those of the collective approach are not. The estimates of the sharing rule show that wages have a strong influence on bargaining power within couples.
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
413.81 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.