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Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series 09/13
This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending. We find that a spending cap always favors the a priori popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate and spend contributions.
Campaign finance reform
Spending limit
Expenditure limit
Incumbency advantage
Clean elections
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Working Paper

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