Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71290
Authors: 
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 90
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes whether the behavior of potential offenders can be guided by information on the actual detection probability transmitted by the policy maker. It is established that, when viewed as a cheap-talk game, the existence of equilibria with information transmission depends on the level of the sanction, the level of costs related to imposing the sanction, and the level of social harm resulting from the offense. In addition, we find that the policy maker (i.e., society as a whole) is not necessarily better off ex ante when more information is transmitted in equilibrium, but that potential offenders always are.
Subjects: 
crime
cheap talk
law enforcement
imperfect information
JEL: 
K42
H23
C72
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-089-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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