Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71247
Authors: 
Demichelis, Stefano
Ritzberger, Klaus
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 115
Abstract: 
Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games.
Subjects: 
perfect information
subgame perfection
equilibrium correspondence
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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