Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71200
Authors: 
Dorofeenko, Viktor
Shorish, Jamsheed
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 124
Abstract: 
Epstein (1998) demonstrates that in the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game it is possible to sustain cooperation in a repeated game played on a finite grid, where agents are spatially distributed and of fixed strategy type ('cooperate' or 'defect'). We introduce a methodology to formalize the dynamical equations for a population of agents distributed in space and in wealth, which form a system similar to the reaction-diffusion type. We determine conditions for stable zones of sustained cooperation in a one-dimensional version of the model. Defectors are forced out of cooperation zones due to a congestion effect, and accumulate at the boundaries.
Subjects: 
Prisoner's Dilemma
demographic
active media
reaction-diffusion
JEL: 
C61
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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