Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71194 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 89
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We re-examine the common wisdom that cross-border mergers are the most effective merger strategy for firms facing powerful unions. In contrast, we obtain a domestic merger outcome whenever firms are sufficiently heterogeneous (in terms of productive efficiency and product differentiation). A domestic merger unfolds a wage-unifying effect which limits the union's ability to extract rents. When asymmetries among fims vanish, then cross-border mergers are the unique equilibrium. However, they may be either between symmetric or asymmetric firms. Social welfare is never higher under a domestic merger outcome than under a cross-border merger outcome.
Schlagwörter: 
Unionization
International Oligopoly
Endogenous Mergers
Countervailing Power
JEL: 
D43
J51
L13
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-088-8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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