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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper No. 2012/19
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that, when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling.
Schlagwörter: 
Fiscal Transparency
Electoral Pressure
Signaling Game
Perfect Sequential Equilibrium
JEL: 
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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