Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71143
Authors: 
Moretti, Laura
Suzuki, Toru
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CFS Working Paper 2012/19
Abstract: 
This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that, when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling.
Subjects: 
Fiscal Transparency
Electoral Pressure
Signaling Game
Perfect Sequential Equilibrium
JEL: 
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
427.56 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.