Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71118
Authors: 
von Blanckenburg, Korbinian
Hanfeld, Marc
Kholodilin, Konstantin A.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 1274
Abstract: 
In this paper, we develop a market screening model to detect inconstancies in price changes. Although there is a long history of industrial organization research of collusion, price setting behavior, and conduct - a robust model to detect structural changes in market structure was missing so far. Our non-parametric approach closes this gap and can be used as a tentative warning system for emerging collusions. Based on the theoretical and empirical results from previous research, we describe requirements of screenings, develop a model, and illustrate our approach with a short market simulation. Finally, we apply the model to the German electricity market. According to our results, between 2001 and 2011 energy suppliers appear to be successful in controlling the market price for several phases.
Subjects: 
market screening
collusion
competition policy
energy markets
JEL: 
L10
L60
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
509.69 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.