Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71090
Authors: 
Hielscher, Kai
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapier, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre 113
Abstract: 
We show that, in a two-stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society's endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution.
Subjects: 
central banking
monetary policy
communication
delegation
positive analysis
JEL: 
E52
E58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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