Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70666 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2011-16a
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA
Zusammenfassung: 
We evaluate the effects of laws designed to protect borrowers from foreclosure. We find that these laws delay but do not prevent foreclosures. We first compare states that require lenders to seek judicial permission to foreclose with states that do not. Borrowers in judicial states are no more likely to cure and no more likely to renegotiate their loans, but the delays lead to a build-up in these states of persistently delinquent borrowers, the vast majority of whom eventually lose their homes. We next analyze a “right-to-cure” law instituted in Massachusetts on May 1, 2008. Using a difference-indifferences approach to evaluate the effect of the policy, we compare Massachusetts with neighboring states that did not adopt similar laws. We find that the right-to-cure law lengthens the foreclosure timeline but does not lead to better outcomes for borrowers.
Schlagwörter: 
foreclosure
mortgage
judicial
power of sale
right to cure
JEL: 
G21
K11
R31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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