Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70665
Authors: 
Quinn, Stephen
Roberds, William
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2012-8
Abstract: 
In August 1763, northern Europe experienced a financial crisis with numerous parallels to the 2008 Lehman Brothers episode. The 1763 crisis was sparked by the failure of a major provider of acceptance loans, a form of securitized credit resembling modern asset-backed commercial paper. The central bank at the hub of the crisis, the Bank of Amsterdam, responded by broadening the range of acceptable collateral for its repo transactions. Analysis of archival data shows that this emergency source of liquidity helped to contain the effects of the crisis, by preventing the collapse of at least two other major securitizers. While the underlying themes seem to have changed little in 250 years, the modest scope of the 1763 liquidity intervention, together with the lightly regulated nature of the eighteenth century financial landscape, provide some informative contrasts with events of late 2008.
Subjects: 
shadow banks
central banks
liquidity
JEL: 
E58
G01
G21
N21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
457.54 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.